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The Joint Committee on Federal Social Security Amendments
originally drafted California's extensive State Supplementary
Program, under the leadership of our former State Assemblyman,
now Congressman, John L. Burton.

Because of the magnitude of

California's investment in aiding its aged, blind and disabled
--almost $500 million last year, more than $600 million this year
--the Committee has continued to monitor the novel experience
of federal administration of state monies.
We are fortunate to have regular contact with both state
and federal administrative agencies.

At the same time we receive

requests daily from individual constituents and state and federal
legislators for help in resolving SSI problems.

In this way, we

are able to measure the impact of policies and agency claims of
improved performance against the yardstick of recipient satisfaction.
It is clear to us that after a year and a half of operation,
the SSI program still has far to go before legislators, administrators, and the public can be fully confident that the program
is doing the job Congress intended.

In making this conclusion,

we recognize the tremendous effort Social Security Administration
has made taking on the program and then attempting to cope with
the almost overwhelming difficulties the program has faced.

Nor

do we disregard the encouraging signs that the worst is now
behind us.
But recent improvement still must be viewed in terms of what
the Social Security Administration itself has set as its standards,

and what the public has a right to expect.
1.

INADEQUATE STAFF AT SOCIAL SECURITY.

Commissioner

Cardwell of the Social Security Administration urges the need
for additional staff to help

pro~ess

SSI cases.

Original

staffing estimates were based largely on the Title XVI program
as it was originally proposed to Congress, and did not adequately
take into account the many Congressional changes both before
and after HR-1 finally passed.

The assumption persisted that

SSI cases would not take as long to process as a regular Social
Security claim.

We have been told that, based on these assump-

tions, Social Security requested 19,000 new employees to handle
SSI nation-wide.

The situation was worsened when Social Security's

estimates of new staff needed to run SSI were woefully short of
the mark.

The situation was worsened when OMB made further re-

ductions in the new employee authorization.
The program rapidly overwhelmed the staff.
a dizzying spiral upward.

Overtime began

In the last three months of 1973, as

District Offices prepared for SSI, overtime doubled over the
previous quarter to almost 600,000 hours.

In January, 1974 alone,

the first month of SSI operations, more overtime was used than
in the entire previous four months.

Total overtime used by the

Social Security Administration in the first year of SSI operations
was more than 6,700,000 hours.

This is 3 1/2 times as high as

1973's overtime, and represents the amount of work it would take
a single worker almost 38 centuries to perform.
The effects of short staffing are still being felt.
#>
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They

cannot be overemphasized.

Inadequate staff means overworked

employees who lack time for proper training, are inclined to
make greater errors, are unable to adapt quickly to changes in
policy or procedure, take longer to do the basic work, and are
more inclined to seek other work elsewhere.

As a result, the

level of experience and proficiency of staff remains low.
Inadequate staff does not add to other problems; it multiplies them.
Our first recommendation, then, would be to do whatever is
necessary to give Social Security Administration the basic
human resources to operate the program smoothly and efficiently.
2. POOR INFORMATION FLOW AND COORDINATION WITHIN SOCIAL
SECURITY.

SSI was engrafted onto an administrative structure

which was not prepared to deal with means tests and programs
based on need.

Except for the Bureau of Supplemental Security

Income (BSSI), the program operates through bureaus which have
existed many years, and have their own ways of doing things.
So, although BSSI is supposed to be the bureau which sets
basic policy in the program, instructing staff what the policy is
and how to implement it is the responsibility of the Bureau of
Field Operations

(BFO, formerly the Bureau of District Office

Operations, BDOO).

Thus, we have a tremendous duplication of

efforts under which

~

bureau has its own manuals setting forth

SSI policy--the SSI Handbook, published by BSSI, and the Claims
Manual, published by BFO.

Each is massive, each is updated almost

daily as policy and/or procedures change.

-3-

The same is true in disability cases, which fall under the
-

province of the Bureau of Disability Insurance (BDI).

BDI is

somewhat more comprehensive in its approach, establishing not
only disability criteria, but actually monitoring performance
of the evaluation process.

BDI has its own publications dealing

with the peculiarities of disability, yet these documents often
repeat materials found in both the Handbook and the Claims Manual.
It has always been the intention of Social Security to integrate all of this material into the Claims Manual which will eventually become the single source of information.

But for the past

18 months, and presently, policy materials relating to SSI are
issued by the three bureaus already mentioned, without any indication that any one of them is overseeing the flow of information
to the District Offices.

Additionally, specialized units work-

ing on particular problems may send out their own infrequent
instructions to staff.

The information blizzard is joined by

occasional gusts from regional offices which send out their own
materials to cover local peculiarities of policy or procedure.
The result in the District Office is a daily avalanche of
material from innumerable sources, in ever-changing formats, in
which SSI policies may compete for attention with materials
regarding regular Social Security and Medicare.

Little wonder

that it seems to take inadequate staff so long to implement
changes in policy or improved procedures.
This pattern persists with respect to statistical and
management data needed to assess program performance and take
corrective action.

Each bureau keeps its own kinds of data
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and does not often, or even frequently, share this information with others.

Numerous times the staff of our Committee

has been told by one bureau that certain statistics are not
kept and cannot be obtained, only to find that another bureau
has exactly what we need.
Overall, in fact, management data about SSI has been much
less than adequate.

For example, one indicator of how well

cases are being handled is how long it takes to process a claim
from application to actual payment.

While a computer-generated

report has been promised since the program began, so far as
we know there is nothing currently available.

The computer

report has been issued, but sporadically.

At one point it was

decided to stop publishing it altogether.

It was revived in

March of this year, but the only report provided us since then
had the processing times crossed out with "Do Not Use" handwritten over that section.
To some extent this is explainable as a result of inadequate staff pressed to do everything possible simply to get
checks to eligible recipients.

But without adequate management

data, it is impossible to know exactly how to improve the system
to get the best use of resources.
A recent re-organization of Social Security places all of
the bureaus involved in the SSI program under a single Office
of Program Operations.

Whether this will improve the communica-

tions between the bureaus or better co-ordinate the flow of
information to the District Offices remains to be seen.
certainly represents a step in the right direction.
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It

3.

COMPUTER SYSTEMS LIMITATIONS.

Commissioner Cardwell

has stated that when the SSI program began, the computers were
not fully able to handle the work.

The computers were completely

incapable of issuing checks to some kinds of cases.
Since then, new computers have been added, programs have
been refined, and new procedures have been developed to correct
mistakes.

But still, the computers are unable to issue checks

to all eligible persons.
In Region IX, for example, approximately 6-7,000 checks
each month must be manually issued.
the parties concerned.

This imposes burdens on all

The process to issue checks manually does

not begin until the recipient complains to the Social Security
Office.

A manually-issued check will not arrive until two to

three weeks later.
In one case which came to our attention, the computer had
never issued a check to a woman who should have been automatically
converted from the state Aid to the Disabled program when SSI
began.

After 15 months, the woman still had to call her Social

Security office to tell them her check hadn't arrived, then
wait two to three weeks for a hand-issued check.

Her check for

March, 1975 did not finally arrive until almost the middle of
April.

Everyone seemed to agree the problem was a mistake in

her Social Security number as it appeared in the SSI records.
no one seemed able to correct the problem, nor did anyone ever
begin the manual procedure in time to assure her of getting a
hand issued check on the first of each month.
Since she did not receive a computer-generated check , she
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But

did not receive a Medi-Cal card.

California depends on Social

Security -for the names of all SSI recipients.

But Social

Security is only able to provide the names of people who get
computer-generated checks.
Because the manual issuance process takes so long, the
woman was given a temporary loan by her county welfare department under a unique program California instituted to deal with
the problem of non-delivered SSI checks.

This required the

woman to travel to the next county to the nearest Social Security
office to obtain necessary verification of her eligibility,
then back to her home county to the nearest county welfare
office.

She would then have to go to a second welfare office

still further away to obtain a hand-issued Medicaid card.

These

burdens were greatly increased by the fact that the woman is
disabled and has no automobile.
We should mention that after we discussed this case in a
public hearing in April, the Regional Commissioner of Social
Security personally intervened, and recently told me that the
woman's problems have been solved.
While this case is an extreme example, it does highlight
what happens when the computer system cannot cope with a case.
And, there are still major situations the computer is unable to
handle.

One persistent example is the married couple who both

became eligible for SSI, but on different dates.

Say the husband

becomes an SSI recipient, and 8 months later, his wife turns
65 and also becomes eligible.

At that point, the computer, which

has been paying the husband dutifully, suddenly stops paying
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either of them.
Another major problem with couples is what happens when
one member dies.

The computer is unable to adjust the grant

to pay the survivor the amount to which an individual is entitled.
Special procedures have been developed for some of these
situations.

None of them seems to anticipate the problem, only

to compensate for systems limitations when the problem arises.
Usually the computer is "forced" to issue a check which its
program says should not be issued, or pay a grant amount which
the program says is improper.
But the basic problem persists that the computer systems
are not able to cope with many common situations or everyday
occurrences, with the result that checks are not properly adjusted
to reflect current circumstances, or, worse, suddenly stop
altogether.
4.

LONG DELAYS IN PROCESSING.

The most

frequent~complaint

we hear from recipients is that Social Security seems to take so
long to process SSI cases.

The problem involves not only initial

applications, but changes in the recipient's situation.

For

example, many recipients have told our staff that they fear that
if they move, their SSI checks will stop since it seems to take
up to 6 months for Social Security to process a change of address.
It is at the initial application point, though, that recipients have the greatest concern.

This is because the person

who qualifies for SSI has insufficient income to meet his or her
needs.

Every day of delay means another day of essential

expenses that cannot be met.
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Commissioner Cardwell has stated that the median time
for processing aged SSI claims is now 38 days, and for disability cases it is 77 days.

This does not mean that eligible

individuals received payments within these times.

Remember

that because of human errors and computer limitations, many
individuals who have been found eligible do not receive their
payments.
Further, the figures Commissioner Cardwell used are medians.
This means that only half the cases were processed in these
periods~

half took longer.

In fact, some cases took more than

a year to process.
Before going further,we must remind you that data has never
been available to us to show how long it takes from initial
application to actual payment.
provided us.

However, some data has been

It indicates that Social Security should be far

from pleased with its present performance.
Case processing is broken into several steps.

First,

there is the evaluation of income and resources in the District
Office.

Then, if the case involves a disability, it is evaluated

in a separate disability determination unit operated by the
state under contract with Social Security.

If the case is

eligible for SSI, it should be entered into the computer, and no
further action is necessary.

However, should the computer not

be able to issue the check, the case may be sent to Data Processing for further work.
In analyzing these processes, we are relying on Social
Security's "SSI-MARS Management Analysis and Review System,"
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the most recent issue of which covers February, 1975.
One measure of how well cases are being processed is the
number of cases which have been in the District Offices more
than 20 days.

Social Security has set a national goal to have

only 25% of the disability workload in the District Office more
than 20 days old.

Yet, as of the end of February, 1975, 41.5%

of the disability cases had been in the District Office more
than 20 days.
In aged cases, the performance measured against Social
Security's own standards was worse.

The goal is to have only

10% of the aged cases pending more than 20 days.

As of the end

of February, however, 40.4% of the aged cases were older than
20 days, more than four times as many as Social Security would
desire.
At the state agencies where disability evaluations are
performed, the goal is to have only 7.5% of the caseload pending
more than 45 days.

Actual performance at the end of February

indicated the goal was far from being met, with 20 . 4% of cases
having been at the state agency more than 45 days.
At Data Processing, which attempts to do whatever is
necessary to get the computer to pay problem cases, no processing goals have been set.

Two measurements are used, however,

the number of cases pending more than 30 days, and the number
which have been pending more than 90 days.

At the end of

February, there were more than 202,000 cases at BDP.

59.2%

of them had been there more than 30 days, and almost half of
these, 26.9% of the BDP caseload, had been there more than
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three months.
-

--

In Region IX, the Bureau of Disability Insurance regularly
samples SSI cases to track processing times.

('tile might mention

this as another example of poor inter-bureau coordination of
effort and communication, since

no~e

of the other bureaus seems

to be able to provide the same information for their processes,
nor, as far as we know,do they make use of the BDI data.

In

fact, when our staff asked for similar data nationally, we were
told that the central office does not make a similar compilation.)
In February, 1975, in Region IX, median processing time
was 70 days, slightly better than the national median.
though, that half the cases took longer than 70 days.

Remember,
How much

longer is graphically shown by the firgure that 34% of the cases
had taken more than three months, and took up to 372 days--a
year and a week--to process.

This meant that at least one case

processed in February, 1975 was an individual who had first
applied for SSI in January, 1974.

(In January, 1975, at least

one case was completed which had been opened 406 days earlier-some time in November or December, 1973.)
Interestingly, although the disability evaluation program
operated by the state is frequently blamed for the long delays
in processing disability cases, the Social Security District
Offices have had cases pending there longer than any at the
state agency.

Some cases languished in the District Offices as

long as 330 days, while none was at the state agency more than
286 days.
These processing time statistics are dramatically underscored by the requirements the Secretary of HEW imposed on the
-11-

states in processing these very
programs.

~~ses

in

~heir

state welfare

Under the Secretary's regulations, except in unusual

situations, the states were required to process claims for aid
to the aged within 30 days of application, and disability cases
in 60 days.
Measured against any standards, Social Security Administration
still is not responding adequately to the concerns of Congress
or the needs of recipients in processing its caseloads.
5.

POOR INTERGOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS.

It is unfortunate

but true that the various federal and state governmental agencies
involved in SSI administration have less than perfect relationships.
More pervasive, however, is the inadequate co-ordination
between the two levels of government.

The result is the creation

of large administrative gaps through which recipients too often
fall.

Representatives of our state's welfare agency will tell

about the tremendous problems which exist trying to have Social
Security offices refer SSI recipients to state service and aid
programs for which the recipients qualify.
We have already mentioned the problem California has trying
to issue Medical cards automatically to all SSI recipients.
Because Social Security's data exchange does not include recipients who are not paid automatically by the computer, as many as
10,000 recipients a month are not issued Medi-Cal cards to which
they are entitled.

They must obtain confirmation of their

ssr

eligibility, then obtain a Medi-Cal card which the county must
issue by hand.
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The disabled and elderly cannot easily tolerate the
inconvenience of this burdensome procedure especially when
it must be done month after month.

(The state, by the way,

has its own burdens, to the tune of more than $1 million spent
hand issuing Medi-Cal cards to SSI recipients who were not
included on Social Security's data tapes.)
Another extremely annoying example is the notice about
Medicaid sent to all persons in states where Social Security
administers the state supplement.

The notice tells the unfort-

unate recipient that "An agency of your State will get in touch
with you about the Medicaid program in your state.

You don't

need to do anything more about Medicaid until you hear from
them"
This is completely misleading.

In the first place, Social

Security has never instructed the states to seek out SSI
ineligibles and enroll them in Medicaid.

Worse, the states have

no way to find these people, since Social Security only sends
the states lists of eligible individuals, and does not provide
the names of persons denied SSI or terminated from the program.
As a result, thousands of elderly, blind, and disabled individuals
each month are wrongly advised not to apply for medical assistance for which they may be eligible, and which they may desperately
need.
State officials in California pressed Social Security to
change this deceptive practice.
have made similar attempts.

We do not know if other states

But, in California, the process of

trying to tell recipients the truth has involved negotiations
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between the state and federal governments which have gone o n
for almost a year.

First, Social Security had to be convi nce d

that it had a responsibility not t o mis l ead recipien ts , and t o
tell them directly that they should contact the sta t e t o obtai n
medical assistance.

Then the state had to decide what language

·social Security should use in making the referral.

So far as

we are aware at the Joint Committee, the negotiations are still
incomplete, and Social Security continues to deceive thousands
of recipients each month.
6.

HARSH AND COMPLEX POLICIES.

Commissioner Cardwell

continues to stress the complexity of the SSI program.

The

Secretary's regulations do little to ease the problem.

As an

example, we encourage you to read the regulations dealing with
individuals living in someone e l se's h ousehold.

Congress has

required that grants to these indivi duals be reduced 1/3 to
account for the value of room a n d board contributed to them by
the head of the household.

As an exerci se in f utility, we

e n courage you to read the regu lations wh i ch are supposed to tell
you who gets reduced 1/3 and who doesn ' t.

You will find them

in the Claims Manual at Section 12310, and the SSI Han dbook a t
Section 6065.
To see how unusually restrictive the administrative interpretation of Congressional policy can be, we can t hink of no
better example than the rules regarding income "deemed " to be
available to an SSI recipien t from a spouse or parent wi t h
whom the recipient lives.

In Section 1614(f) of the Soci a l

Security Act, Congress directed the Secretary to es t a bli s h
policies regarding deeming, leaving to administrati ve di s cre t ion
-14-

the question of how much of a spouse or parent's income
should be deemed available to the SSI recipient.

Without

questioning the Congressional decision to deem income avail~e

to a recipient in this situation, there are serious problems

in the manner the Secretar y has adopted to implement the policy.
For example, consider a husband and wife living together.
The husband does not meet any categorical qualification for SSI,
and has income from a private pension.

The wife is sufficiently

disabled to receive SSI, but some of the husband's income is
deemed available to her .

In computing the amount deemed avail-

able to the wife, the Secretary has decided that the husband
shall live on $73 a month.

All the rest of his income is deemed

to be his wife's.
The regulations do not explain how it was decided the
husband should have a standard of living only half as much as
an SSI recipient is paid.

In states which supplement the federal

payment, the husband's living standard is even less in comparison
to the amounts paid SSI recipients.

In California, $73 a month

is less than 1/3 of what a single SSI recipient is paid.
But the real point is that, by allowing the husband only
$73 a month for his living costs, most of his income is deemed
available to his wife, who may thus be ineligible for SSI.

In

states which supplement the SSI grant, the couple may be forced
to live on less than the comparable grant standard .
eligible couples currently receive $440 a month.

In California,

This is the

minimum California considers an adult married coupl e requires
to meet their

ne~ds.

Yet , in our example, if the ineligible
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husband has a private pension of only $328 a month , his
disabled wife cannot receive SSI.

Both are forced to live on

a monthly amount more than 25% below the grant standard.

Many

people working in agencies which directly serve the elderly
have expressed their belief that this policy encourages elderly
couples to separate.
In the case of eligible disabled or blind children, income
is "deemed" available from parents.

A person over 18, however,

is considered an adult, and no income is deemed available even
though the individual lives with his or her parents.

A disabled

person of age 19 can receive SSI while living at home regardless
of the parents' income.

(Although the grant may be reduced l/3

in this situation because the individual is living in the
household of another.)
However, Congress has defined "child" to include students
between 18 and 21 years old.

The Secretary's regulations interpret

this to penalize individuals in this age group while they attend
school, by classifying them as "children", and deeming income
to them from their parents .
A dismaying example of the result has occurred several times
in San Francisco.

Federal , state and private agencies have educ-

ational programs to help the trainable mentally retarded acquire
sufficient skills to become self-supporting.

The programs are

often designed particularly to serve the retarded between ages
18 and 21.

However, as soon as the individual enrolls in this

program, the Secretary classifies him or her as a "child", and
deems income available from the parents.
cases is termination of the grant.
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The result in many

In

§h9~t,

the P-Olicy encourages those who might be trained

to be self-sufficient to remain idle, while at the same time
discouraging them from obtaining education benefits designed
to help them become, at least partly, if not totally, selfsupporting.
Altogether, the regulations governing SSI can be complex ,
harsh, and self-defeating.
7.

EMERGENCY AID PROGRAMS INADEQUATE TO THE NEED.

Three

programs exist to help SSI recipients in dire financial emergencies.
First, a person eligible for SSI may receive a $100 advance
on the first SSI check.

Although not even half the SSI payment

amount in California, this short-term solution has helped many
of the constituents who have contacted the Joint Committee about
problems getting checks once they have been found eligible.
But it is small help in the face of administrative delays
that can mean many months before the first SSI check is finally
issued by the computer , if it is issued at all.
A second program will allow a disabled applicant to receive
assistance for up to 90 days if the individual is "presumptively "
eligible for SSI. Frankly, we have never understood why Congress
denied this same benefit to the elderly and the blind.

But

until very recently, the Secretary's regulations made it unavailable to all but a very few of the disabled.

Until three months

ago, to be presumptively eligible an applicant had to have

(1)

a leg amputated at the hip, (2) any two limbs amputated, or (3)
total deafness.

The regulations were recently modif i ed to
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!nc!ud~

the __ !flore

comp~ll i ng c~ses

of terminal can cer, or

total hospital confinement after a serious accident.
But the great prob l em here is t h e fact that the benefits
are only available for 3 months.

With hal f the disability

cases taking more than 77 days, and more than a third still
unresolved after 3 months, and some taking more than a year,
the 90 day limitation is clearly insufficient.

Congress should

strongly consider amending the Act to allow presumptive eligibility paymen t s through the time that a final decision as to
eligibility for SSI has been made.
The third program to he l p individuals in financial emergencies is the replacement of lost or stolen checks.
two problems here.

There are

First, the program only helps people

whose checks have actually been issued by the computer.

It is

not available to that large group to whom the computer is unable to issue checks at all because of systems limitations.
These individuals must wait through long delays while their
checks are manually processed.
woman

This is what happened to the

referred to earlier whose checks never arrived for

fefteen consecutive months .

The process to issue a check

manually, by the way, is grossly misnamed the "One Time Payment"
procedure, even though in many cases "One Time Payments" are
made several more times than once .
The second problem with the lost or stolen check replacement program is that, while faster than manually issuing checks,
it s t ill takes 7-10 days.

These are days in which the recipient

is unable to pay rent, or buy food.

A delay of a few days is

critical in the life of the needy at the economic margin of
-18-

subsistence.
I strongly endorse Congressional and Legislative efforts
to vest Social Security with whatever authority is needed to
provide checks to all eligible persons whose grants do not
arrive on time within 24 hours of the recipient's notice to
Social Security.

B.

COST OF LIVING ESCALATORS ON RESOURCE LIMITATIONS.

Congress wisely provided that the purchasing power of SSI
grants would not be eroded by inflation, and built into the Act
an automatic cost-of-living provision.
At the same time, nothing was done to recognize that the
purchasing power of the income and recources of recipients--the
11

means 11

,

which are the subject of the means test--is reduced by

a rising cost of living.

A cash reserve of $1,500 today will

purchase much less than the same money would have bought 18
months ago.

On the other hand, to purchase what $1,500 would

provide in January, 1974 an individual today has to spend over
$1700.
On the other hand, some resources, particularly real property,
tend to increase in value over time.

This is in large degree

simply another aspect of inflation, since to purchase the same
piece of property requires an ever greater number of dollars whose
purchasing power is diminishing.
By not allowing resource limitations to increase at the same
rate as the cost of living, Congress restricts the SSI program to
people who have assets whose real ability to provide an alternative means of support is steadily diminishing.
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Thus people who have assets of fixed value, such as cash,
which are over the resource limits, may be ineligible today,
even though their assets would not support them at the same
level $1,500 would have provided yesterday.

Individua l s with

assets whose value increases over time, such as real property,
may be eligible for SSI today, and ineligible tomorrow.

This

is exactly what can happen to some property-owning recipients
in San Francisco this year when the city reappraises the value
of their homes.
An obvious and simple answer is to provide in the statute
for the same cost of living escalator on resource limits that
is given in the grant itself.
9.

FISCAL RESTRICTIONS ON STATE SUPPLEMENTATION.

Finally ,

we come to one of the most troubling concerns of the California
l egislature.

To illustrate the problem, consider the grant in

California to a single aged individual, presently $259 a month.
Of this, the federal government pays $151,
60% .

or approximately

The state pays the remaining $108,or around

40% .

Yet,

at the end of last calendar year, of total expenditures on cash
grants to the elderly, blind and disabled, California had spent
almost 60%, while the federal government spent just over 40%.
The primary reason this occurred is that income of recipinets
goes first to offset the federal contribution.

Not until an

individual has $151 in chargeable income is the state able to
reduce its contribution to the grant.

On the other hand, a person

with more than $151 chargeable income receives a grant paid
entire l y by the state, and nothing from the federal government.
This is true in each of t h e 32 states which provide mandatory or
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optional supplements above the SS I g r ant .
---- - - --- -- To put the matter in persp ective, the si t uation can be
viewed i n light of the fo rmer progr ams where stat e a n d federal
governments s h ared equal l y in the grant , and in a ny offsetting
recipient income .

Had this experience continued under SSI,

Ca l ifornia's adult aid expenditures in calendar 19 7 4 woul d have
been approximately $80 million less than we actually spent.
This would be about what the state would have to pay under the
former sharing formula in order to provide its SSI recipients
true cost of living adjustments in their grants.
Under the present system, however, every dollar above the
SSI level must be paid by the state.

So, if California were to

increase SSI grants to account for cost of living changes over
the past 18 mont hs , the state would have to bear the entire cost ,
presentl y estimated a t about $170 million.

The Legislature is

now trying t o cope with t h e problem of assuring the purchasing
power of the grant is not eaten away by inflation , and tryin g
to pay for it.
The federal "ho l d har mless .. provision does not offer any
rea l help to the state .

The Con gressional formula protects the

state up to the leve l of adult aid grants in 1 972 .

But California

had l aw going back 13 years which raised its adult grants every
year to account for cost o f l i v ing increases.
had similar p rovisions.

Many other states

The h old harmless provi sion which is

b a sed on 1972 grant leve l s of f e r s t h e sta t e n o h e l p in trying to
hold grants at t he l eve l s p aid i n 1 973 .
Nor does the hold harml ess provision offer any assistance to
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the state which wishes to increase its present level of state
supplementation to account for rising living costs.
Various proposals have been made to build into the hold
harmless formula protection for cost-of-living increases in
state supplementation.

It is this Committee's understanding

that Congress is currently considering several different proposals which would insure that a cost-of-living increase is
received by all SSI beneficiaries.
The State of California has a keen interest in assuring
California's elderly, blind and disabled, that inflation will
not rob them of the ability to purchase the basic necessities
of life.

With Congressional help, we can assure the citizens

of California and all other states that they will be able to
continue to afford the cost of simply staying alive.
SUMMARY.

In short, the SSI program has yet to fulfill the

promise of HR-1.

Understaffing, poor administrative operations,

and computer limitations seriously hamper the ability to process
cases quickly and accurately.

Poor inter-governmental working

relationships create huge gaps into which many recipients fall,
failing to receive adequate help from either federal or state
agencies.

Inadequate programs to aid those in financial crisis,

and harsh, unduly complex regulations make it unnecessarily
difficult for the elderly, blind, or disabled in need to receive
assistance.

Fiscal restrictions impose tremendous financial

burdens on states which supplement SSI, and may cause grants to
be eaten away by inflation.
It is clear that more , much more, needs to be done legislatively and administratively.
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Strong, direct, immediate action

is needed to unsnarl the massive foul-ups which still hinder
the effectiveness of SSI.
We do have one particular suggestion in this regard we wish
to give special emphasis.
As Commissioner Cardwell noted, one of the greatest factors
contributing to the problems of SSI has been the administrative
process within Social Security Administration.

While the Agency

staff are conscientiously trying to do their best, the structure
and procedures of the Social Security Administration often seem
to stand in the way of the best intentions.

Commissioner

Cardwell has acknowledged many of these difficulties, and has
stated that a task force organized and supervised by the Agency
is now working on the problem.
We respectfully urge that this is not enough.
The Administrative problems which create so much misery for
SSI recipients are shared by Social Security recipients as well.
These problems are different in the SSI case only because the
recipient lacks adequate, if any, alternative means of support.
Many, if not most, of these problems predate the SSI.

We're sure

that each of you has direct knowledge of the massive difficulties
your constituents faced trying to obtain Social Security benefits,
long before there was an SSI program.
We are greatly concern ed, therefore, that any "in-house"
appraisal of needed administrative reforms will be too vulnerable
to the myopia to which all of us are prone after years of doing
a job in a set way using the only tools we have available.

It

may never occur to us that a single, different tool can help us
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do the work faster and better.

Or, if the idea does occur, it

is too often rejected simply because it is different or because
we just don't know how to change.
We suggest, then, that a first priority for Congress should
be to authorize a private, highly reputable management analysis
consulting group to make a full-scale, in-depth study of the
structure and procedures of the entire Social Security Administration, with particular emphasis on the SSI program.

This review

should then be reported back to Congress to enable you to evaluate the recommendations, monitor their implementation, and make
any needed legislative changes.
We cannot stress too much the need to take all steps to
assure that the administrative mechanism is in the best of condition.

Any legislative program must always depend on an effi-

cient, smoothly functioning administrative agency to be effectively implemented.

Simply put, you need good tools to do a

good job.
The investment in such an intensive, thorough appraisal
could bring immeasurable returns in helping the SSI program
fulfill the goals set by Congress, better aid to the needy, and
create confidence that the program is adequately and conscientiously serving the public.

It can help assure that we can soon

add SSI to the long list of proud accomplishments in government
efforts to serve the needs of the citizens.
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